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Abstract: In times of crisis, an entrepreneur often must decide whether to 
liquidate the company and the whole business or to renew it by activating a 
turnaround process. A tool increasingly used in international practice is the 
turnaround index, which can determine whether a company can continue its 
activities in the future according to the going concern assumption, which is the 
index measured as a function of the economic and financial performance of  
the company. This measure can take values between 0.1, for satisfactory 
performance and therefore unlikely to turn around, and 0.9, for unsatisfactory 
performance and therefore a high propensity to turnaround. The index 
determines whether there is a higher or lower risk for a company to enter into 
crisis. The aim of this paper is to test the effectiveness of the turnaround index 
in assessing the turnaround urgency by choosing a sample of the Italian 
companies. 
Keywords: turnaround; going concern; turnaround urgency; crisis forecast; 
crisis assessment; insolvency; insolvency forecast models; company’s health; 
Z-score. 
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Provasi, R. and Riva, P. 
(2016) ‘The ability of the turnaround index to assess going concern 
assumptions: evidence from its application to Italian listed companies’, Global 
Business and Economics Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp.54–81. 
Biographical notes: Roberta Provasi received her PhD in Business 
Administration from Pavia University. She is an Associate Professor of 
Business Administration and Accounting, Auditing and Corporate Governance 
at the Milan Bicocca University. Since 1992, she has been a registered 
chartered public accountant and auditor. Since 2005, has been a member of the 
scientific committee of graduate studies in business administration and 
coordinator of masters in business administration program. She has several 
publications mainly dealing with accounting and auditing issues. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    The ability of the turnaround index to assess going concern assumptions 55    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Patrizia Riva holds a PhD in Business, Economics and Management from the 
Milan Bocconi University. She is an Associate Professor of Accounting, 
Auditing and Corporate Governance at the University of Eastern Piedmont. 
Since 1994, she has been registered as a chartered public accountant and 
auditor. Since 1999, she has been the Chief Executive of the High School of 
Certified Public Accountants Institute of Milan. She has several publications 
mainly dealing with accounting and auditing issues. 
This paper is a revised and expanded version of a paper entitled ‘The 
turnaround index’ presented at 24th B&Esi Conference, Florence, 7 July 2014. 
 
1 Introduction 
The aim of the research is to examine the methods for evaluations linked to the  
going concern principle, which is the assumption on which financial statement 
preparation is based: a company is considered able to continue and to conduct its business 
activity in the foreseeable future without the need to liquidate, to cease activity, or 
become subject to insolvency proceedings. The increasing attention given to the issue of 
going concern has increased the importance of crisis forecast and assessment of the state 
of a company’s health and has therefore increased the development of several models to 
verify more accurately the long-term ability of companies to maintain activity over time. 
Identification of a declining situation in the short term or at least maintaining control of 
the company’s health is essential as it helps to prevent the spread of crisis, to increase the 
success probability of the turnaround processes, to stop value loss. The research presents 
an empirical analysis conducted in the Italian context to assess the effectiveness of the 
turnaround processes adopted by the analysed companies using two different approaches: 
the Z-score model and a second model known as the turnaround index, which allows the 
use of a function that is able to assign a score based on the company’s health condition. 
The dependent variables of the function are financial statement indicators, and the 
coefficients of each variable, or more clearly, the incidence to be assigned to each 
indicator, were determined using statistical software based on logistic regression to 
measure the correlation between the selected ratios calculated for a sample of companies 
and their turnaround urgency or health conditions. The sample is companies from Milan 
all share index, which excludes companies in the financial and insurance services 
industries. Turnaround urgency has been deduced from the independent auditor opinion 
expressed in relation to the company’s going concern. The authors identified four 
companies that in recent years have had going concern difficulties to test the efficacy of 
the turnaround index by comparing it with the one produced by the Z-score method. The 
analysis further considers two companies that seem to have overcome their crisis 
situation (Pininfarina Group and Bioera Group), and two other companies that still 
declare that they are facing it (Bialetti Group and Stefanel Group). Registered results 
seem to be consistent. 
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2 Going concern assessment methods: relevant research 
Over time, the methods used to support the assessment of the going concern assumption 
have become more complex, accurate and appropriate (McGough, 1974). The first 
insolvency forecast models were designed after the great depression of 1929. In previous 
years, banks granted loans without adequately considering the customer’s reliability and 
capability to refund the loan. The depression experience helped in the creation of the 
perception of a new information need, so that models started to be conceived to identify 
the signs of a business crisis. The tools developed were based on analysis of financial 
statements and the use of mathematical and statistical techniques (Holmen, 1988). As 
analysing the trends of the calculated indices presented a high subjectivity level and 
required specific skills for those who were asked to implement the analysis, the 
introduction of statistics therefore became important. This was considered relevant to 
reduce the subjectivity of such assessments (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). 
A first distinction between different assessment models can be made distinguishing 
the theoretical from the empirical model (Madonna and Cestari, 2010). 
Theoretical models, based on a deductive approach, require only the formulation of 
some hypotheses and the use of algorithms to calculate the insolvency probability. These 
models, however, were not commonly used as they produced unreliable results when 
used to identify corporate crisis symptoms. 
Empirical methods, based instead on an inductive approach, requires users to follow 
some relevant steps to calculate them: 
a select a sample of existing firms 
b analyse the situation of the selected companies 
c conceive a model for the analysed companies 
d generalise the model so that it can be applied to other existing businesses. 
The first two steps had to be performed in the financial statement analysis, and the last 
two, which represent the generalisation process, required the use of mathematical and 
statistical techniques. 
Figure 1 Empirical models to assess going concern: a framework 
 
Source: Adapted from Madonna and Cestari (2010) 
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Previous research has classified the empirical methods (Madonna and Cestari, 2010; 
Teodori, 1989) as shown in Figure 1, which gives a useful framework used in our 
analysis. 
2.1 Traditional empirical methods 
The proposed framework considers two traditional approaches: univaried and multivaried 
(Teodori, 1989). 
The univaried approach, as applied to going concern assessments, consists of the 
analysis of the various indexes separately with the aim of identifying which among the 
others better describes whether a company can continue its activity. An early important 
study in the 1960s analysed the prediction capability of some indicators regarding 
insolvency phenomena (Beaver, 1966, 1968). In particular, this method has been used 
with a sample of companies that insolvent or in broader terms, facing difficulty in 
repaying their debts. In addition, this method has been considered for use with companies 
defined as healthy. Comparisons between the two classes of companies has revealed a 
systematic difference among the index’s average of healthy companies vs. insolvent ones. 
The analysis was conducted using a dichotomous classification test to identify an optimal 
separation point or a cut-off for the indexes with the aim of reducing classification errors. 
The author concluded that the best predictive index was, among six others, the ratio of 
cash flow:total debt. The main limit of the model was recognised as its ability to consider 
the various indexes one by one its inability to determine relations among them (Cestari, 
2009; Teodori, 1989). 
The multivaried approach as applied to going concern assessment requires, on the 
contrary, simultaneous consideration of the various companies’ aspects (Andrew, 1986; 
Marco and Varetto, 1994; Teodori, 1989). 
The main methods of this approach are: 
a The linear discriminant analysis (and therefore the Z-score model) and the logistic 
regression represent the first group of studies used in the definition. The Z-score 
model is based on linear discriminant analysis (Altman, 1968). This approach (a kind 
of multivaried analysis) was first introduced by Fischer with the aim of classifying 
an object in two or more populations that have their own characteristics, considering 
specific variables to build the taxonomy (Fischer, 1936). The Z-score model is a 
linear model built using on one hand a sample of companies bankrupt between 1945  
and 1965 and on the other hand a sample of companies considered healthy  
relative to going concern situations. The two groups of companies present similar 
characteristics in terms of size, sector and referring period. The result of the research 
was the construction of an insolvency forecast model that involved the use of five 
variables represented by five financial statement indices. The set of indices was 
chosen considering their incidence level defined as their capacity when considered 
together to describe the company situation more accurately. The model resulted in 
the following equation: 
1 2 3 4 51.2 1.4 3.3 0.6 1.0Z X X X X X= + + + +  (1) 
 where X1 = working capital/asset, X2 = retained earnings/assets, X3 = EBIT/assets,  
X4 = market value of net assets/total debt to third parties, and X5 = turnover/assets. 
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 The level of accuracy of the Z-score, that is, its ability to forecast correctly the 
solvency or insolvency of the companies, has been widely studied: The accuracy  
has been considered very high if the forecast was performed with one or two years 
before the insolvency. On the contrary, the level of accuracy decreased if the 
forecasting referred to a more distant period. The model requires assignment of a 
score to the companies analysed and comparison to the cut-off score (i.e., the  
Z cutoff of 2,675), which represents the discriminant or referring parameter. Based 
on this comparison, it was theoretically possible to classify a firm as healthy or 
insolvent. The model was not so dichotomous in that it produces a gray area (defined 
by a range of scores from 1.81 to 2.99) when used for predictive purposes. Despite 
the determination of a cut-off point, an identified range of values were defined as an 
uncertainty zone for which an opinion about the bankruptcy probability for firms 
whose Z-score cannot be given with any accuracy. Altman’s (1968) work has been 
widely appreciated as innovative. When his use of indices was criticised, Altman 
answered that these warn about the coming of insolvency but cannot reveal the 
reasons for it, so that subjective interpretation is still needed. 
b The logistic model represents the second approach analysed. It considers a 
qualitative dependent and dichotomous variable that describes whether the company 
belongs to one of two categories: healthy (Y = 0) or insolvent (Y = 1). Meanwhile, all 
indices were considered independent variables. This model then uses a specific 
version of the regression called the linear probability model, which uses values 
assumed by the function that vary between 0 and 1 and reveal the probability that a 
will be classified as healthy or insolvent. The model was based on the assumption of 
the existence of a relation between the probability of a firm to become insolvent and 
the values assumed by a set of financial indicators that were considered strongly 
related to the insolvency event. The function was built considering the incidence of 
each independent variable, which requires determination of their specific correlation 
with the insolvency event. Zavgren (1985) provided a relevant application of the 
logistic regression used in this context. 
c Other studies have attempted to widen the range of information considered by the 
models. One of these was the A-score model, which differs considerably from the 
other methods previously described, as it considers information in addition to the 
financial indices for the going concern assessments. This model was developed by 
Argenti in 1976 based on a the idea that crisis cannot be considered a sudden event 
and analysing the companies’ situations from three perspectives. The first of these 
concerned weaknesses in corporate governance and management, the second was 
potentially serious mistakes made by management, and the last concerns visible 
finance as well as non-financial symptoms of forthcoming crisis. This model 
recognises different weights for the various relevant factors with their sum being 
100%. Implementation of this model by analysts requires their subjective judgment 
as they must choose, among others to give a full score only for the factors they 
considered to be determinant of the specific situation studied and a zero score to all 
others (Candelo, 2005; Teodori, 1989). If the A-score resulted in a level of less than 
25, the company had to be considered as operating in a safe going concern situation, 
whereas if it resulted more than 35, the insolvency risk had to be considered 
consistent. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    The ability of the turnaround index to assess going concern assumptions 59    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
2.2 Innovative models 
The development of artificial intelligence has important consequences in many fields, 
among which is the issue of going concern matters. The techniques belong to a specific 
section of artificial intelligence called machine learning, or automatic learning. This last 
is based on a specific concept. On receipt of outside information related to various 
concrete situations that are part of a certain domain, the system will identify common 
characteristics among the categories and develop generalisations for the selection criteria, 
so that they can also be applied to different cases than those used in the learning process. 
It is worth to recall briefly the main approaches used by those innovative inductive 
models (Cestari, 2009). 
1 Decision trees (Frydman et al., 1985) are a graph, composed according to complex 
ordered relationships, each represented by one or more leaves, which originate from 
the decision knots. Each knot indicates that the test is performed on a specific 
feature. Each possible result that can be achieved with the test originates from a 
branch a knot that lends vitality to a subtree or subset. A leaf constitutes the terminal 
part of a tree and allows one to distinguish a category of individuals. 
2 Case-based reasoning (CBR; Kolodner, 1992) is a form of reasoning, based on 
experience acquired in similar cases already addressed, to solve a particular problem 
and find a solution. The concept on which this technique is based is not needed 
necessarily to identify and generalise the knowledge acquired in a particular field but 
instead to recover a variety of cases that have already been analysed in the past and 
archived, leaving them available to ensure that they can be used as a resource for 
problems that may appear in the future. To solve a problem, it is not necessary to 
understand the various causes that constitute it but only to observe the behaviour 
adopted in the past in similar situations and the way the problem been faced and 
resolved. 
3 Neural networks (Boritz and Kennedy, 1995) represent an automatic learning 
technique. They are composed of a large number of elementary units, each of which 
is connected with the other, and are able to do simple calculations. The result of this 
technique derives from a group of units that interact with each other according to 
various entity terms. In the economic and financial area, the networks confer several 
advantages, including the ability to describe adequately the phenomena, high 
flexibility and adaptability. However, among the networks’ disadvantages is an 
absence of a theory that defines the optimal architecture to be considered in the 
various problems faced and the learning parameters. In addition, neural networks 
cannot guarantee the analyst’s comprehension of the operation and the significance 
of the results. 
4 Genetic algorithms (Holland, 1975; Kingdon and Feldman, 1995; Varetto, 1998)  
are processes of optimisation inspired by concepts of natural evolution proposed  
by Darwin, in which there are two inevitable processes: genetic selection and 
reproduction. The first identifies which of the components of the population survive 
and reproduce, and the second one includes the genetic recombination. Natural 
algorithms start from those principles, which are used to solve a problem; they will 
not act on a specific solution but on a set of solutions, with the aim to evolve them 
until they reach optimal levels. 
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3 The turnaround index 
When a company faces economic distress or crisis, assessment of the going concern 
principle has great importance relative to the set of actions being implemented. When in 
fact a risk for the going concern of the business is considered, it becomes fundamental to 
the definition of strategies that will enable the institution to regain vitality. The process of 
reorganisation and restructuring of a company in crisis is defined as turnaround, which is 
the process that first identifies the causes that led to the crisis and subsequently develops 
a strategy that allows the firm to regain its profitability. The definitions of turnaround in 
the doctrine are numerous and varied (Castrogiovanni and Burton 2000; Guatri, 1986; 
Schendel et al., 1978; Slatter and Barlow, 2003; Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001), but in all 
cases, it is considered a process that helps the company to overcome a crisis situation. 
Activity needed before the company starts a turnaround process includes assessment of 
how convenient it is for a firm to choose it as an alternative to the liquidation or sale of 
the company. To evaluate the convenience of a recovery strategy, a double comparison is 
required: 
• first, between the benefits that the company can glean from a recovery and the 
resources needed to implement such a process 
• second, to be performed in case the first comparison yields a positive difference, 
between the recovery net benefits and the benefits of liquidation of the company. 
It is a relevant juncture and a difficult choice is needed that involves not only significant 
financial issues but also psychological ones. Indeed, on one hand, entrepreneurs’ choices 
are often characterised by low rationality levels, and, on the other hand, more relevant 
variables need to be considered, such as the potential effects of the recovery on 
stakeholders including, first of all, employees. Moreover, time pressure affects the 
efficacy of the process. The alternative to a turnaround process that is considered 
inappropriate is the burdensome resolution to close and liquidate the company with the 
sale of single assets or business units or, at best and if possible, the sale of the whole 
business to third parties. 
The composition of a well-structured turnaround plan represents the heart of the 
recovery process. The plan is a document in which the policies to be undertaken and the 
effects that they generate are formalised. In addition, the plan is the instrument needed to 
legitimise management’s future actions and behaviours as it discloses management ideas 
and decisions. When presented to stakeholders, the plan becomes the instrument by 
which to clarify the preferred recovery strategy and to try to reach an agreement about it. 
Heal-all strategies do not exist. Each plan must be composed with careful consideration 
of the companies’ condition, which implies that one must asses, among other things, the 
reasons for the economic and financial disarray, business characteristics, competitors’ 
conditions, and impact and sustainability of the recovery process compared to the 
company’s equity and turnover. 
The earlier a turnaround urgency is perceived, the higher is the probability of 
avoiding the liquidation option. It is then clear that turnaround process assessments are 
needed and that instruments that are able to help label situations as soon as possible 
should be implemented both to help managers make decisions on time and to help 
stakeholders better judge whether the proposed solution is to be preferred, as, if it is 
formulated on time, could grant a better way out. 
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The present research focuses on this matter and on the use of a specific measurement 
tool that has been proposed in recent years: the so-called turnaround index. It takes into 
consideration company performance as well as financial and asset composition. The 
index can assume values between 0.1 for companies that achieve satisfying performance 
with a low turnaround urgency, and 0.9, for companies that register, on the contrary, 
unsatisfying performance with a high turnaround urgency. To determine the turnaround 
index, various financial indicators are mainly considered: 
1 return on sales (ROS) 
2 ROI deviation 
3 turnover deviation 
4 equity/total asset ratio 
5 debt/equity ratio 
6 interest coverage ratio 
7 cash flow from operations. 
In Italy, the model has been promoted by Borsa Italiana (see http://www.borsaitaiana. 
it/turnaround) but no specific scientific studies have been implemented to verify its 
usefulness in the Italian context (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2 Turnaround index (see online version for colours) 
 
Source: Borsa Italiana (http://www.borsaitaiana.it/turnaround) 
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4 Research question, sample and methodology 
We have pointed out that the earlier a turnaround urgency is perceived, the higher is the 
probability of avoiding the liquidation option. The research then tries to test the 
usefulness of the turnaround index to assess turnaround urgency. The analysis is 
conducted to the Italian context, in which the Stock Exchange Authority, Borsa Italiana, 
has disclosed its positive judgement of the tool and where the recent worldwide recession 
is still claiming victims so that the number of subjects potentially interested in using the 
tool may be particularly high. 
The sample considered is structured as follows: 
a 164 companies listed in the all-share index of the Italian Stock Exchange1 were 
considered. Data were extracted using the Bloomberg database. Some companies 
were not considered as: 
1 belonging to bank and insurance industry because of their particular activity, 
which would have implied a different interpretation of the financial indexes 
examined 
2 not all the information needed was available. 
 The basket of selected companies seemed nonetheless adequate to the purpose. 
b A restricted group of four companies (Pininfarina, Bioera, Bialetti, and Stefanel)  
was chosen from the selected ones. The sample was restricted by identifying four 
companies that belong to different sectors. The causes of the financial imbalance are, 
as reported, declining demand for its products, which led to liquidity deficit and then 
compromises in the integrity of loans for acquisition strategies and expansions 
implemented before the beginning of the crisis of 2007. These have had or still have 
going concern problems: the first pair, Pininfarina and Bioera, have almost overcome 
the crisis situation, and the second pair, Bialetti and Stefanel, still face an uncertain 
situation. More detail is provided below. 
1 Pininfarina was founded in 1930 in Turin by Battista Pininfarina, also known as 
Pinin. The company was designed to build special car bodies for individual 
customers or in small production runs. In the 1930s, automobiles were reserved 
for a minor elite, but Pinin felt immediately the diffusion and so he embraced 
the cause of modernity and aerodynamics. After World War II, Pinin and his son 
Sergio started the production of a new model Lancia, the design of which 
marked a decisive turning point in automotive style. The Pininfarina style 
conquered Enzo Ferrari their relationship defined some of the most beautiful 
cars ever built and evolved constantly for many years. After Pinin’s death in 
1966, Sergio, became the chairman of the company. He continued the formal 
quality of design and style. In the mid-1970s, Sergio attested the necessity to 
separate the Centro Studi e Ricerche from the industrial division to give greater 
visibility to the creative sector and to offer its clients more design service from a 
tailor-made centre. In 1986, the company was listed in the stock exchange. 
Pininfarina’s industrial expansion continued throughout the world with the 
development of a range of industrial design services for automotive styling with 
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 many clients and partners (e.g., Maserati, Ferrari, Motorola, Alfa Romeo). At 
the end of 2006, the negative trend of the market and the continuing crisis in the 
automotive industry resulted in decreased production. Starting from its roots and 
a solid reputation achieved during 80 years of its history, Pininfarina had to 
redesign its business model and its strategy for the future with a focus on the 
three main pillars: industrial design service, sustainable mobility and brand 
extension. Because of performance deterioration in 2008, Pininfarina signed an 
agreement with the bank for debt restructuring. A turnaround process started at 
that point, first by undersigning a recovery and resolution plan with banks. 
Strategic issues then had to be faced during the following years when the 
company tried to focus more on the core business. In fact, Pininfarina faced the 
crisis especially with strategic repositioning. It modified its core business, which 
traditionally had been based on the production of automotive orders and focused 
instead on engineering services and the electric car market. The company also 
significantly reduced the number of employees and the debt position with the 
sale of shares (see Table 1). 
Table 1 Pininfarina 2007/2012 financial indices 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Net assets 155.1 39.0 10.0 48.7 21.0 9.6 39.8 
Net financial position 120.9 185.5 100.1 43.7 59 77.9 30.6 
Turnover 526.4 713 527.3 186.1 204.4 53.9 63.8 
Ebitda (11.9) 12.8 6.9 2.9 (6.3) 4.7 (11.6) 
Ebit (43.5) (103.3) (177.8) (35) (20) (8.7) (8.2) 
Net results (21.8) (114.5) (204.1) (30.7) (33.1) (11.5) 32.8 
2 Bioera was created in 2004 from a union of companies that specialised in the 
production and sale of organic and herbal products, natural cosmetics and food 
supplements. Since 2007, because of a series of difficulties related to the 
expansion occurred as the result of acquisitions that caused significant liquidity 
problems. The restructuring plan was based on a growth path supported by 
financial resources obtained thanks to the share capital increase obtained by 
offering a wider range of products and improvement of services offered to 
customers by strengthening the distribution network and growth in foreign 
markets. In 2008, the financial situation was worsening because of the difficulty 
of obtaining credit and poor liquidity that generally relates to the Italian context. 
In 2009, the company started a turnaround process, which was finalised two 
years later when the court approved a pre-insolvency agreement with creditors. 
Since 2011, financial figures show improvements in the situation. Bioera 
managed to overcome the crisis thanks to the growing demand for organic 
products that have allowed it to sustain sales and then to find more favourable 
agreements with banks and the possibility of new investments for the 
distribution of products (see Table 2). 
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Table 2 Bioera Group 2007–2012 financial indexes 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Net assets 31.0 27.7 (10.4) (9.7) 17.9 18 
Net financial position 38.8 41.4 42.9 25.4 3.5 1.9 
Turnover 112.9 119.4 120.7 69.7 44.6 47.1 
Ebitda 6.5 5.5 1.4 1.2 8.7 3.7 
Ebit 4.0 2.3 (10.7) (0.5) 8.2 3.2 
Net income 0.3 (2.4) (12.8) (3.1) 11.3 0.2 
3 Bialetti is a well-known group for the production and distribution of home 
products, such as cooking tools and in particular for coffee machines. The 
company was founded in 1919 when Alfonso Bialetti opened a workshop to 
make semi-finished aluminium products. Motivated by an entrepreneurial spirit 
and thanks to brilliant intuition, in 1933, Bialetti introduced the Moka Express. 
The art decò design of this product revolutionised the way coffee is made in the 
home. In 1947, Francesco Ranzoni, grandfather of today’s chairman, founded a 
company that specialised in making aluminium saucepans: Rondine Italia. In the 
1980s, this company was one of the first in Italy to use non-stick coatings and 
screen printing on its products. In 1993, Rondine Italia acquired Alfonso Bialetti 
& Co., an entrepreneurial choice that allowed many successes in subsequent 
years. In 2002 was the birth of the present-day Bialetti industries. The desire to 
be even more competitive on the market led to the acquisition of many historical 
brands and leaders in steel production (Girmi, Aeternum). Bialetti industries has 
been listed on the Italian Stock Exchange since 2007. Since 2008, the company 
has experienced a deterioration in financial position and economic performance. 
The following year a standstill agreement was achieved with major banks and a 
recovery and resolution plan was composed and approved for a three-years 
period (2009–2011). The Group was not able to achieve the goals shown in the 
approved plan nor to fulfil the financial parameters considered in the agreement. 
In 2011, a new plan, valid for the period 2011–2015, had to be implemented. In 
2012, the situation was still uncertain but, despite a further decline in income, an 
improvement in EBIT, in part as a result of cost reduction and higher margins 
from sales, has been attained. Bialetti has not yet fully concluded the turnaround 
process as it operates in an adverse economic context characterised by decreases 
in demand that require continuous updates of the industrial and financial plans 
(see Table 3). 
Table 3 Bialetti 2007/2012 financial indices 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Net assets 54.7 28.1 20.1 7.1 2.2 4.2 
Net financial position 95.1 109.2 96.1 98.6 90.4 85.2 
Turnover 220.7 210.2 194.2 184.5 173.9 162.1 
Ebitda 26.8 (1.7) 12.1 (2.4) 11.8 0.9 
Ebit 16.1 (13.5) (1.9) (14.6) 3.6 7.1 
Net results 4.1 (25.9) (7.4) (18.7) (2.8) 0.8 
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4 Stefanel has been active in the fashion industry with the Stefanel brand since 
1982. Today, the company has an international dimension and operates in 
clothing retailing through two business units, Stefanel and Interfashion. Carlo 
Stefanel began to produce knitwear in 1959 in his factory, the ‘Maglificio 
Piave’. In 1970, his son took on the management of the company, and in 1983, 
Stefanel became the company name. In the 1980s, Stefanel, from a series of 
acquisitions and international alliances, became a large industrial group; it 
diversified the production of knitwear by adding sportswear, jeans, and  
ready-to-wear articles. In 1987, the company was listed in the Milan Stock 
Exchange as operating in the cloth industry. In 2006, the company started a 
process of repositioning the brand to focus on products with the highest rotation, 
to maintain inventories and to adopt more competitive prices and with more 
appropriate outlets for the new products. This strategy has entailed considerable 
costs in an already market negative context, and since 2007, the company 
experienced deterioration in financial position and economic performance. In 
2008, the board of directors deliberated an exit from the Star segment of the 
Stock Exchange to enter in the standard MTA segment. In 2009, a three-year 
(2010–2012) Debt Restructuring Agreement was achieved. In 2012, the Group 
had a decrease in sales but a net improvement in Ebit and Ebitda, and the 2013 
half-year results were worse than expected. The Stefanel Group is still trying to 
cope with the crisis using debt reduction, increasing capital, transferring shares 
and renewing the outlets. Unfortunately, the Stefanel context environment is 
characterised by strong recession (see Table 4). 
Table 4 Stefanel 2007/2012 financial indices 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Net assets 73.4 82.4 38.8 51.3 65.9 44.9 
Net financial position 98.3 73.2 80.2 71.6 35.8 67.9 
Turnover 316.4 275.4 181.9 182.5 193.6 186.6 
Ebitda 4.5 2.3 (34) (26.5) (20.5) (3.2) 
Ebit (10.9) (10.8) (50.5) (36.6) (38.7) (16.7) 
Net results (26.7) (20.8) (48.7) (35.3) 14.5 (20.1) 
The analysis aims to test the effectiveness of the turnaround index in identifying 
turnaround urgency. The test is conducted using: 
1 the traditional Z-score method 
2 a model inspired by the turnaround index. 
The second model is based on the use of a function that allows one to rate the turnaround 
urgency (y) of each company whose dependent variables are represented by six selected 
financial indices and the coefficients of each variable (which represent the incidence of 
each index) has been determined using a logistic regression with R statistical software. 
Turnaround urgency (y) has been deducted from the independent auditor opinion  
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expressed in annual reports and in relation to the company’s going concern. The use of a 
going concern audit opinion was considered very relevant to this analysis because the 
problem of estimating the going concern assumption has assumed importance in recent 
years because of the uncertainties and risks that characterise the current economic 
scenarios. As stated by IAS 1, the going concern assumption is a fundamental principle in 
drawing up the financial statements and an aspect to be evaluated critically by the 
auditors as required by ISA 570. In Table 5, the last column reports the value 0 for the 
companies with no turnaround urgency (healthy companies) and value 1 for the 
companies with turnaround urgency (companies in crisis). 
Data were extracted using the Bloomberg database for each of the 164 companies  
of the sample and are shown in the table and were used as an input for the logistic 
regression. The selected indices are the following: 
• ROS (x1) 
• ROI (x2) 
• turnover 2012/turnover 2011 (x3) 
• equity/total asset ratio (x4) 
• debt/equity ratio (x5) 
• cash flow from operation/turnover (x6) 
• turnaround urgency (y). 
The interest coverage ratio has not been included in the model because of the difficulties 
related to special fiscal issues in finding the necessary information for the Italian context. 
The remaining indices were calculated after a careful analysis of the financial statements 
to detect (even by the reclassification of financial statements) necessary data for the 
calculation of the indices. 
A logistic regression using R statistical software was used to measure the correlation 
between the values assumed by the selected financial indices and the turnaround urgency. 
The model identified the various coefficients to be assigned to each function variable and 
the resulting function resulted the following: 
1 2 3 4 5 60.2273 0.0143 1.0124 0.0406 0.2937 0.0040 0.0179Y x x x x x x= + − + − − −  (6) 
The lower the score – (when the value tends to zero or is less than zero), the lower the 
turnaround urgency and the lower the uncertainties relative to going concern conditions 
of the company (or the better the health of the company). On the contrary, the higher the 
score (when the value nears 1 or is greater than 1), the higher the turnaround urgency and 
the higher the uncertainties relative to going concern conditions of the company (or the 
worse the health of the company). Compared to Z-score trends, is it possible to say that 
the turnaround index assumes asymmetric relevance. 
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Table 5 Data extracted from Bloomberg database of 164 companies 
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Table 5 Data extracted from Bloomberg database of 164 companies (continued) 
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Table 5 Data extracted from Bloomberg database of 164 companies (continued) 
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Table 5 Data extracted from Bloomberg database of 164 companies (continued) 
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Table 5 Data extracted from Bloomberg database of 164 companies (continued) 
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Table 5 Data extracted from Bloomberg database of 164 companies (continued) 
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Table 5 Data extracted from Bloomberg database of 164 companies (continued) 
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Table 5 Data extracted from Bloomberg database of 164 companies (continued) 
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5 Results analysis 
The methods represent a way for companies that are still involved in a crisis situation or 
that have not completely overcome the crisis to understand whether there have been 
improvements over time or whether the going concern uncertainties have increased. 
This section presents the results obtained from application of the two different 
assessment models to the four selected companies for the crucial periods: 
• 2008 crisis period for the companies analysed 
• 2010 period of turnaround interventions 
• 2012 period when Pininfarina and Bioera overcame the crisis and Bialetti and 
Stefanel were still implementing recovery and restructuring procedures. 
5.1 Results for Pininfarina 
Both models highlight an improvement from 2008 to 2012 with a score from the Z-score 
model that increased from 0.51 to 1.14. The value of turnaround index improved, 
decreasing from 0.55 to 0.27. Analysis of the single variables indicates improvement of 
all indices considered. Results confirm that the two tools provide a useful synthesis of the 
situation (see Table 6). 
Table 6 Pininfarina 
Indices of Pininfarina group Coefficient 
Pininfarina 
2008 2010 2012 
Z-score model 
Z = 1.2x1 + 1.4x2 + 3.3x3 + 0.6x4 + 1.0x5 
x1 = working capital/total assets 1.2 0.5014 0.5998 0.6486 
x2 = retained profits/total assets 1.4 0 0 0.1660 
x3 = ROI 3.3 –0.3029 –0.0622 –0.0415 
x4 = market value equity/total of third-party debts 0.6 0.0175 0.0699 0.2524 
x5 = turnover/total assets 1 0.8979 0.6347 0.3230 
Score  0.5104 1.1912 1.1477 
Turnaround index 
Y = 0.2273 + 0.0143x1 – 1.0124x2 + 0.0406x3 – 0.2937x4 – 0.0040x5 – 0.0179x6 
x1 = ROS 0.0143 –0.3374 –0.0980 –0.1777 
x2 = ROI –1.0124 –0.3029 –0.0622 –0.0415 
x3 = turnover 2012/turnover 2011 0.0406 0.7392 1.0956 1.1834 
x4 = equity/total asset ratio –0.2937 0.0170 0.0653 0.2016 
x5 = debt/equity ratio –0.0040 0.0374 0.1037 0.4078 
x6 = cash flow from operation/turnover –0.0179 –0.1958 –0.0630 –0.3363 
Score  0.5576 0.3149 0.2761 
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5.2 Bioera 
Both models highlight an improvement from 2008 to 2012 with a Z-score model score 
that rose from 1.93 to 2.23 and an improved value for the turnaround index, which 
decreased from 0.17 to 0.34 and then to 0.13. These changes attest to the reduction of the 
turnaround urgency for the group. Only the turnaround index noted the worst net results 
in 2010, during an intermediate stage of the restructuring procedure. Results confirm that 
both tools provide a useful synthesis of the situation. The higher sensitivity shown by the 
first index is possible as net incomes decrease and negative equity are considered when 
determining the turnaround indices not considered in the Z-score model (see Table 7). 
Table 7 Bioera Group 
Indices Coefficient 
Bioera 
2008 2010 2012 
Z-score model 
Z = 1.2x1 + 1.4x2 + 3.3x3 + 0.6x4 + 1.0x5 
x1 = working capital/total assets 1.2 0.5438 0.3958 0.4679 
x2 = retained profits/total assets 1.4 0 0 0.0491 
x3 = ROI 3.3 0.0198 –0.0130 0.0684 
x4 = market value equity/total of third-party debts 0.6 0.3119 –0.2017 0.625 
x5 = turnover/total assets 1 1.0258 1.8151 1.0064 
Score  1.9307 2.1261 2.2374 
Turnaround index 
Y = 0.2273 + 0.0143x1 – 1.0124x2 + 0.0406x3 – 0.2937x4 – 0.0040x5 – 0.0179x6 
x1 = ROS 0.0143 0.0193 –0.0072 0.0115 
x2 = ROI –1.0124 0.0198 –0.0130 0.0684 
x3 = turnover 2012/turnover 2011 0.0406 1.0846 0.5775 1.0535 
x4 = equity/total asset ratio –0.2937 0.2380 –0.2526 0.3856 
x5 = debt/equity ratio –0.0040 2.1641 –1.3857 1.8980 
x6 = cash flow from operation/turnover –0.0179 0.0381 0.0531 –0.0199 
Score  0.1725 0.3426 0.1384 
5.3 Bialetti 
Both models highlight an improvement from 2008 to 2012 with a score of Z-score model 
that increased from 1.68 to 2.009 and the value of turnaround index, which improved, 
decreasing from 0.28 to 0.21, which attests to the reduction of turnaround urgency for the 
group, although there still remain significant uncertainties about going concern.  
A close look at the specific values for each variable indicates that the improvement in 
both methods results from improvements in operating income, which increased from 
(13.5) to 7.1 (see Table 8). 
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Table 8 Bialetti Group 
Bialetti Group indices Coefficient 
Bialetti 
2008 2010 2012 
Z-score model 
Z = 1.2x1 + 1.4x2 + 3.3x3 + 0.6x4 + 1.0x5 
x1 = working capital/total assets 1.2 0.6923 0.7133 0.6857 
x2 = retained profits/total assets 1.4 0 0 0.0130 
x3 = ROI 3.3 –0.0618 –0.0788 0.0441 
x4 = market value equity/total of third-party debts 0.6 0.1477 0.0399 0.0268 
x5 = turnover/total assets 1 0.9624 0.9962 1.0068 
Score  1.6779 1.6159 2.009 
Turnaround index 
Y = 0.2273 + 0.0143x1 – 1.0124x2 + 0.0406x3 – 0.2937x4 – 0.0040x5 – 0.0179x6 
x1 = ROS 0.0143 –0.0642 –0.0791 0.0424 
x2 = ROI –1.0124 –0.0618 –0.0788 0.0441 
x3 = turnover 2012/turnover 2011 0.0406 0.9524 0.9501 0.9321 
x4 = equity/total asset ratio –0.2937 0.1287 0.0383 0.0263 
x5 = debt/equity ratio –0.0040 1.0849 0.6961 0.3952 
x6 = cash flow from operation/turnover –0.0179 –0.0385 –0.0168 0.0600 
Score  0.2863 0.3309 0.2122 
5.4 Stefanel 
The results obtained for Stefanel show a gap between the two methods: the Z-score 
model shows that the situation improved in 2012, whereas the turnaround index points to 
a worsening condition. It is not possible to establish a priori which of the results should 
be considered more reliable. Perusal of the annual report and a search for additional 
information about the group yielded that Stefanel has not yet resolved its going concern 
problems. The turnaround index trend seems to be more consistent for findings that are 
highlighted by specific analysis (see Table 9). 
Table 9 Stefanel Group 
Stefanel Group indices Coefficient 
Stefanel 
2008 2010 2012 
Z-score model 
Z = 1.2x1 + 1.4x2 + 3.3x3 + 0.6x4 + 1.0x5 
x1 = working capital/total assets 1.2 0.3902 0.3956 0.5774 
x2 = retained profits/total assets 1.4 0 0 0 
x3 = ROI 3.3 –0.0345 –0.1228 –0.0813 
x4 = market value equity/total of third-party debts 0.6 0.3576 0.2103 0.2799 
x5 = turnover/total assets 1 0.8801 0.6176 0.9085 
Score  1.4491 0.8131 1.5010 
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Table 9 Stefanel Group (continued) 
Stefanel Group indices Coefficient 
Stefanel 
2008 2010 2012 
Turnaround index 
Y = 0.2273 + 0.0143x1 – 1.0124x2 + 0.0406x3 – 0.2937x4 – 0.0040x5 – 0.0179x6 
x1 = ROS 0.0143 –0.0392 –0.1989 –0.0893 
x2 = ROI –1.0124 –0.0345 –0.1228 –0.0813 
x3 = turnover 2012/turnover 2011 0.0406 0.8704 1.0088 0.9639 
x4 = equity/total asset ratio –0.2937 0.2633 0.1736 0.2187 
x5 = debt/equity ratio –0.0040 2.8219 3.6643 0.8889 
x6 = cash flow from operation/turnover –0.0179 –0.0102 –0.1408 –0.1757 
Score  0.2087 0.3268 0.2827 
6 Conclusions 
The goal of this research was to demonstrate the effectiveness of the turnaround process 
undertaken by four companies by applying two different methods, the Z-score model and 
the turnaround index. 
By summarising the data collected (see Table 10), it is possible to perform a 
comparative analysis. 
Table 10 Data synthesis 
 Pininfarina  Bioera 
08 10 12 08 10 12 
Z-score 0.5104 1.1912 1.1477  1.9307 2.1261 2.2374 
Turnaround 0.5576 0.3149 0.2761  0.1725 0.3426 0.1384 
 Bialetti  Stefanel 
08 10 12 08 10 12 
Z-score 1.6779 1.6159 2.009  1.4491 0.8131 1.5010 
Turnaround 0.2863 0.3309 0.2266  0.2087 0.3268 0.2827 
The data calculated using the Z-score method shows an improvement in the time range 
considered for all four companies. The turnaround index instead certifies better scores for 
all except for Stefanel, which had a slight deterioration (from 0.2087 to 0.2827). The 
analysis of data contained in the first-half report for 2013 shows a worsening of some 
indicators especially related to Ebit and Ebitda, which certifies that the results of the 
Turnaround are more reliable. 
For both methods, Bioera produced the best performance; in fact, the data shows that 
the company achieved a balanced budget. 
The worst value for both methods relates to Pininfarina for 2008, when the company 
considered the turnaround process to be urgent. 
The values reported by both methods are significant for Bialetti and Stefanel, which 
also reported the intermediate trend adequately. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    The ability of the turnaround index to assess going concern assumptions 79    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Even in this case, the turnaround index is more accurate because detected even the 
slight worsening of Bioera reported in 2010 as a result the bankruptcy of the Natfood 
company that belongs to the group. 
From the values calculated by the zero score for each year, it is evident that in all 
cases (even for the companies that seem to have overcome the crisis) the results lower 
compared to the cut-off score of 2.765 (established by Altman) that should represent the 
threshold over which the company is considered healthy or better a company that does 
not have going concern uncertainties. 
With the exception of Bioera and Bialetti for 2012 only, all Z-score values calculated 
are less than the minimum value of 1.81, which indicates insolvent companies. 
Particularly significant, for some considerations, are the values of Pininfarina, which 
evidence a serious state of insolvency, according to Altman’s theory, but which are not 
reflected in reality, because, as noted above, the group’s turnaround achieved satisfactory 
economic and financial performance. For Pininfarina, the value calculated by the 
turnaround index is more significant because it takes a value close to 0.1, which indicates 
that company reached its balance. 
It is difficult to say whether the research results are sufficient to establish the validity 
of the model. It is fairly well established that data calculated with indices are more 
truthful about the health status of the analysed companies. The use of the models 
represents a support for the turnaround process analysis. The assessment models 
considered here can provide a good indication of the company turnaround urgency. 
The difference between the two models arises from their different structures: 
• It is not possible to say which method is better for estimation of the state of health of 
the company as the two methods depend on many variables that are interrelated. The 
two models show a good level of consistency between them as the results are 
generally aligned. 
• The turnaround index is based on logistic regression whereas the Z-score model is 
based on the discriminant analysis. In fact, although the discriminant analysis 
supposes that the companies are taken from two different sets and assess of the 
membership of each company as belonging to one of the two categories, the logistic 
model hypothesises that firms are taken randomly from a single population to which 
they belong so as to estimate a given characteristic of the same. Therefore, this last 
does not estimate the membership of an enterprise in a group but the characteristics 
(turnaround urgency) of the group to which the firm belongs. 
• The turnaround index, for 164 companies, has been found to improve the precision 
level for a large number of companies; the Z-score was determined considering  
66 companies. 
This research assesses the usefulness of turnaround index for determination of the health 
estimation of a company and its going concern assumption. As such, there many areas for 
improvement and for further research. In particular, we recognise that our study is subject 
to some important limitations. The first and most obvious is the samples considered. To 
investigate the effectiveness of the model, it would be more appropriate to consider all of 
the listed companies and their performance for a wider period of time. The restricted 
sample also is limiting because each company that is subject to a turnaround process 
develops tools to overcome the crisis. The tools are designed for the various stages in 
which the company might be and are not readily comparable in terms of accounting. 
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Further investigation to test the turnaround index for a larger number of situations that 
may help to recognise the test significance may be necessary. The future steps of the 
analysis must expand the sample to reach a statistical expression in which, apart from 
quantitative factors, some qualitative factors of the crisis also should be considered. Our 
contribution is to produce an empirical study about a current economic topic using an 
approach established by the Italian Stock Exchange, whose international literature do not 
consider the same settings. In the literature, numerous studies have attempted problem 
analysis and crisis forecasting. This study provides innovative view relative to the past, 
when attention was only on asset liquidation to recover claims. At present, the turnaround 
objective is not only to recover the performance of a company in crisis but also to return 
it to its previous performance and possibly to improve it by enhancing the value of 
intangible assets. 
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